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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Eugene Ray Cobell appeals from the judgment of conviction and
concurrent sentences of life with ten years fixed, imposed following jury verdicts
of guilty to rape and penetration by a foreign object.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In November of 2007, 72 year old Cobell was in Boise visiting a sick family
member. (Tr., p. 392, Ls 11-15; p. 405, L. 24- p. 406, L. 21.)

He was staying

with his niece, Cheryle "Cookie" Zwang, and her family in Boise. (Tr., p. 37, Ls.
6-10.) Cheryle's 20 year old daughter Danielle and her younger sister lived there
with Cheryle and her husband Brian. (Tr. p. 27, L. 10- p. 28, L. 7.)
In the early morning hours of November 12, 2007, Cobell returned to the
Zwang residence after an evening of drinking with family members. (Tr., 39, L.
15 - p. 48, L. 25; p. 407, L. 15 - p. 418, L. 3.) Cobell sat next to Danielle on the
couch, talking to her and eventually putting his arm around her. (Tr., p. 51, L. 22
- p. 54, L. 17; 419, L. 2-' p. 422, L. 2.) Danielle had fallen asleep with her head
on Cobell's shoulder when she was awakened by his fondling and groping her.
(Tr., 55, L. 16 - p. 56, L. 12.) Cobell then threw Danielle to the ground took her
clothes off, and forcibly performed oral sex on her, penetrated her with his penis,
and digitally penetrated her anus while holding her head back by pulling on her
pony tail. (Tr., p. 56, L. 16 - p. 61, L. 15.) Danielle eventually broke away from
Cobell and made her way upstairs to her family where the police were called and
responded to the scene. (Tr., 61, L. 20 - p. 67, L. 3.)
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The state charged Cobell with rape and penetration by a foreign object.
(R., pp. 17-18.) The matter proceeded to a jury trial where Cobell testified that

he did have sexual contact with his 20 year old grand-niece Danielle, but it was in
fact initiated by and consented to by her. (Tr., p. 422, L. 12 - p. 432, L. 4.) The
jury found Cobell guilty of both rape and penetration by a foreign object. (R., pp.
70-71; Tr. p. 523, L. 10 - p. 526, L. 2.) Cobell was sentenced to life with ten
years fixed on each charge, to run concurrently. (R., pp. 80-82; Tr., p. 569, Ls.
10-19.)
Cobell timely appeals from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp. 70-71, 8082.)
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ISSUES
Cobell states the issues on appeal as follows:
1.

Did the district court violate Mr. Cobell's Fifth Amendment rights
when it allowed the prosecution to question him about previous
assertions of his rights and allow the jury to infer guilt from such
assertions?

2.

Did the State violate Mr. Cobell's right to a fair trial by
committing prosecutorial misconduct?

3.

Did the errors in Mr. Cobell's trial amount to cumulative
error?

4.

Did the district court abused [sic] its discretion when it
imposed, upon Mr. Cobell, unified sentences of life, with ten
years fixed, following his convictions for rape and
penetration with a foreign object?

(Appellant's brief, p. 7)
The state rephrases the issues as follows:
1. Has Cobell failed to show that the district court violated his Fifth Amendment
rights by allowing the state to engage in cross-examination conducted for the
permissible purpose of impeaching the truth of the version of events testified to at
trial?
2. Has Cobell failed to establish that the prosecutor committed misconduct in
closing argument?
3. Has Cobell failed to establish at least two trial errors that warrant application
of the cumulative error doctrine?
4. Has Cobell failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in
imposing concurrent life sentences with 10 years fixed following a jury's verdict of
guilt for the offenses of rape and forcible penetration by a foreign object?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Cobell Has Failed To Show That The District Court Violated His Fifth Amendment
Rights By Allowing The State To Engage In Cross-Examination Of Cobell For
The Purpose of Impeaching His Version Of Events Testified To At Trial

A.

Introduction
Cobell asserts on appeal that "the district court committed reversible error

when it overruled defense counsel's objection to the State's questions regarding
Mr. Cobell's previous assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights." (Appellant's brief,
p. 8.)

He contends that the "line of questioning was designed to prejudicially

persuade the jury to infer guilt from [his] assertion of his rights."

kl

Cobell does

concede that "[although] some very limited questioning about his silence on the
night in question may be proper cross-examination for impeachment purposes,
the questioning in this case was clearly designed to provide an inference of guilt,"
(Appellant's brief, p. 13) and the district court erred in allowing the questioning to
continue over objection. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8, 13.)
Because the

cross-examination

Cobell

complains

of involved

his

statements to the victim's mother and to first responders on the night of the
events in question which were inconsistent with his trial testimony, it was proper
impeachment cross-examination. Cobell's rights were never implicated.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Whether the admission of evidence violates a defendant's right to remain

silent is a constitutional question which this Court reviews de novo." State v.
Moore, 131 ldaho814,820,965P.2d 174, 180(1998).
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C.

Cobell Has Failed To Show That His Fifth Amendment Rights Were
Affected, Let Alone Violated. By The State's Impeachment Of His Trial
Testimony Through Cross-Examination
Cobell asserts that the "line of questioning [on cross examination] was

plainly an attempt by the prosecution to have the jury infer Mr. Cobell's guilt
based upon his previous silence and invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights."
(Appellant's brief, p. 13.) The record, however, shows that Cobell did not invoke
his right to silence, but instead made statements to the victim's mother and the
police. The state therefore properly cross-examined Cobell and attempted to
impeach his credibility based upon differences between his statements and his
trial testimony. Such impeachment does not implicate any rights of Cobell.
Cobell mistakenly refers to factual omissions in his statements to the
victim's mother and law enforcement on the scene as invocations of his right to
silence. (Id.) Applicable law, however, allows cross examination about why trial
testimony contains factual allegations not asserted in previous statements.

In

Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980), the United States Supreme Court
addressed and clarified this very issue in light of its previous holding in Doyle v.
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), that prohibited the unconstitutional use of postMiranda silence at trial.

Anderson, 447 U.S. at 408 (citations omitted).

In

Anderson, the state cross-examined the defendant regarding an inconsistency in
his statement to officers and his trial testimony and the Court determined that
"[t]he questions were not designed to draw meaning from silence, but to elicit an
explanation for a prior inconsistent statement."
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&

at 409. The Court held that

the omission of facts from the earlier statement did not constitute silence.

kl at

409.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has similarly found that the omission of facts
from one inconsistent statement of a defendant to another does not constitute
silence for the purposes of evaluating a potential violation of a defendant's
constitutional right against self-incrimination. See State v. Wolverton, 120 Idaho
559, 817 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1991) (prosecutor's cross-examination of the
defendant regarding inconsistent positions material to the case was not an
impermissible infringement on his right to remain silent); State v. Rodgers, 119
Idaho 1.066, 812 P.2d 1227 (Ct. App. 1990) (state's cross-examination regarding
inconsistencies in trial testimony with prior statements to police was permissible).
In the present case, Cheryle Zwang testified on direct by the state about
her interaction with Cobell upon being told that he had raped her daughter:
Q:

So did you confront him?

A:

I did. I said - - I said, 'What did you do?' And he goes, 'Oh
Cheryle'. And I said, 'What did you do?' And he goes, 'Oh,
Cheryle' again.

Q:

He called you Cheryle?

A:

Yes. And so I said, 'Stop calling me that.' I said, 'Why are
you calling me that? You know my name.' Like he was
trying to distance himself from us, like he was trying to
pretend we weren't family anymore.

Q:

What did you say to him?

A:

I said, 'What did you do to my baby?' And he goes, 'I didn't
do nothing.' And then I said, 'What did you do to my
daughter?' And he said - - he goes, 'We were just - -.' He
had his hands like this.
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Q:

Okay. You've got your .hands clasped together one inside
the other?

A:

Yeah. And he would kind of rub them like this. And he
goes, 'We didn't - - I didn't do - - we were just being close
and everything.' And I said, 'What do you mean close?' And
he said, 'We were just being friendly and everything.' And I
said, 'What do you mean friendly and everything?' And then
he goes, 'I can't do nothing. I can't.' And I said, 'You did
something, you son of a bitch. You did something. You hurt
her. You raped her.'

(Tr., p. 229, L. 17 - p. 230, L. 19.)

Officer Cambron also testified regarding his

interaction with Cobell in an attempt to determine what was happening when he
first arrived on scene:
Q:

What was the first thing you asked him that you can recall?

A:

The first thing that I asked him was if he knew why we were
there.

Q:

What was his response?

A:

He said he knew.

Q:

What did he say?

A:

He indicated he knew why we were there. And then I
inquired as to try and get some information from him about
what happened because - - if he knows what happens he
could probably explain it to me. The explanation was very
vague, and I had to start digging into it with some leading
questions. And - -

Q:

What sort of vague response did he give you?

A:

The initial story that he explained to me was he was
downstairs with his - - I guess the relationship is a niece or a
grandniece - - and the two of them were downstairs. All the
other family members had since gone to bed after a family
outing. They were downstairs talking about another family
member that had been diagnosed terminally ill with cancer
and then the story would just trail off and he would stop
talking.
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Q:

When you say 'trail off, how do you mean?

A:

It just - - he would be explaining it and then that would be the
end of it. He would stop talking. So I would have to ask,
keep going - - just keep pushing and then what happened
and then what happened.

Q:

And in that context - - in pushing him a little bit - - how did
you do that?

A:

I just kept - - like I just showed you. Asking him 'and then
what happened?', you know, 'who was there?' Asking all
these questions because there wasn't a lot of information
offered. So I had to keep asking questions about, okay, well,
what happened, what were you guys talking about. And
that's when he described the terminally ill family member.
And then what happened, and - -

Q:

Did it get to a point where you said 'what were you doing
with Danielle?'

A:

Yeah. I finally asked him, 'Did anything occur between you
two?' And - -

Q:

What was his explanation to that?

A:

Well, he said nothing - - nothing had happened and then I
got more direct about - - really specific questions as far as
'did you two kiss?' And he told me that he had kissed her on
the neck. And then I asked, Well, did you guys kiss on the
lips?' And he gave a negative response on that. And then I
went into the sexual questions about 'did you engage in
intercourse, the two of you?' And he said no. Then I listed
different types of intercourse, vaginal/penile, manual/vaginal,
anal.

Q:

What was he doing through all that?

A:

He was denying all of those as I asked them.

Q:

When you say 'denying', what was his demeanor like?

A:

Just sitting there saying no.

8

Q:

Did he register any sense of dismay or shock or
embarrassment?

A:

No, not really. It was just simply stating no.

Q:

Okay. Did you ever ask him or did he ever provide an
explanation for what - - for what he considered he was doing
with Danny, Danielle?

A:

He - - after we established that he was kissing her on the
neck, I kind of pushed more on that topic, as far as I knew
these two were related. They are family members so I found
that odd that that would be happening. That's just not
something that normally occurs, so I asked him questions
about that and got an explanation of 'we were being friendly'
is how he described it.

Q:

That they were being friendly?

A:

Correct.

Q:

What did you say with that?

A:

I asked him to clarify what he meant by 'being friendly'.

Q:

What was his response?

Q:

He would just go back to the beginning of the story of we
were sitting there, she has her head on my shoulder, I was
kissing her neck, we were being friendly. So I'd keep
digging about what do you - - what are you describing as
'friendly'? How are you defining 'friendly'?

Q:

At some point did you actually give him an analogy?

A:

I did. I - - since I wasn't getting anywhere with him asking
him to further explain what friendly meant, I gave him the
analogy that Officer Criminen who's standing next to me that
we were friendly, but he doesn't put my head on his
shoulders, vice versa. No one kisses each other's neck, but
we are friendly. So I was trying to give him the idea that
friendly can mean different types of things.

Q:

With that, did he provide any additional explanation?
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A:

No, it was back to the beginning of the story - - the head on
the shoulder, kissing the neck and the stopping.

(Tr., p. 150, L. 3 - p. 154, L. 8.)
Cobell later took the stand in his own defense and presented a new
version of events. Cobell testified that he did in fact have sexual contact with
Danielle, but for the first time claimed that it was Danielle doing the instigating
and his sexual advances were in no way against her will:
Q:

Then what happened?

A:

Well, she asked me about this kiss again and she said,
'Show me', and so I kissed her. Well, when I kissed her
everything went goofy.

Q:

What do you mean went goofy?

A:

She got real aroused and - -

Q:

What do you mean aroused?

A:

She opened her mouth. We started kissing and we had our
tongues in each other's mouth. She turned toward me and
we were kissing. And it was a long kiss. And we kept
kissing.

(Tr., p. 422, L. 19- p. 423, L. 5.) Cobell continued with his new version of events
to explain how the contact escalated between himself and his victim.

Q:

That's fine. Why didn't you break it off?

A:

We were just locked in an embrace and she was moving
against me.

Q:

What do you mean she was moving against you?

A:

She was actually making sexual - - she had her leg over my
leg and I turned towards her and we just continued to kiss
and it was for quite a while and - -
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Q;

Was there any point during this, up until now, to where you
thought that this was inappropriate?

A:

You know, I thought - - when I thought it was inappropriate is
when I first sat down and I had my arms around her and I
thought then about it being - -

Q:

You thought it was inappropriate at that time?

A:

Yes. Because to me, anymore, sex is hugging and kissing
and caressing and - - because that's all it is for me anymore.

Q:

So why didn't you break it off?

A:

Well, I didn't - - that really didn't enter my mind and I don't
know. You know, I just - - I don't have an answer for that
other than when she started to react to me like she did, I
thought, 'Well, she wants sex. She wants sex and I can't
give her that, but - -'

(Tr., p. 424, L. 1 - p. 425, L. 4.)
After Cobell gave his new version of events, the state properly crossexamined him about inconsistencies between his trial testimony and his
statements to Cheryle Zwang and Officer Cambron. The state cross-examined
Cobell about his comments to his niece:
Q:

Okay. And in this night she [Cheryle Zwang] came to you
and she said 'You raped my baby'; didn't she?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And you didn't take the opportunity to explain what really
happened, did you? You didn't tell her; did you?

A:

Would you repeat?

Q:

You never told her that it was Danny who came on to you;
did you?

A:

I didn't get a chance.
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Q:

Oh, wait a minute. She - - you were in her room, in her
guest bedroom, sitting in her home and she is asking you
questions.

A:

I wasn't in her room.

Q:

You were in the guest bedroom of the Zwang home; right?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And when asked if you raped her, you said, 'No'; correct?
Just yes or no, Mr. Cobell.

A:

No, it was in the hall.

(Tr., p. 443, L. 15-p. 444, L. 9.) The complained of portions of the state's crossexamination of Cobell as it relates to his communication with law enforcement is
as follows:
Q:

All right. And when law enforcement came to the house and
they told you that they were there because Danny had
accused you of sexually assaulting her, you didn't tell them
that story either; did you?

A:

I don't understand.

Q:

You never told the police this story; have you? Yes or no?

A:

No.

Q:

And when you went down and were taken to the detective's
office and were given an opportunity to explain your side of
the story, you never offered up any of this; did you?

A:

No.

Q:

So the same - - story that you want this jury to believe, that
would exonerate you if it was quote 'consensual', you didn't
tell anybody about it that night, did you?

Q:

No.

(Tr., p. 444, L. 10 - p. 445, L. 3.)
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The state attempted to illustrate through cross-examination that Cobell
hadn't sufficient time to come up with the version of events testified to at trial on
the evening of the accusation.
Q:

When Cheryle Zwang accused you of raping her daughter,
you told Mr. Carr on direct examination something to the
effect of, 'I had no idea it was coming. I wasn't prepared to
be quizzed that way.' Do you recall that?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And that was the explanation that you gave for why you
couldn't tell Cheryle what was going on, correct?

A:

That's correct.

Q:

Wouldn't it be more fair to say, Mr. Cobell, that you weren't - in saying that you just simply weren't prepared with an
explanation?

Q:

I was shocked.

A:

You weren't prepared - -

A:

I was shocked.

Q:

- - is what I'm asking. The truth is the truth.

A:

I couldn't prepare for anything because I didn't know what
was coming.

Q:

You knew that she was accusing you of rape; right?

A:

Pardon me?

Q:

You knew that you were being accused of rape?

A:

I knew she accused me of rape.

Q:

Right. Cheryle accused you of that as well, right?

A:

No, I didn't know Danielle had. What I'm saying is I knew
Cheryle had accused me of rape. And I didn't know anything
else. That's all I knew is that she had accused me of rape.
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(Tr., p. 453, L. 6 - p. 454, L. 13.) The state further inquired as to why Cobell did
not tell law enforcement that he didn't rape Danielle:
Q:

So when you are being led away in handcuffs at four in the
morning and taken to jail, you didn't think then would be a
good time to set the record straight? That didn't occur to
you?

A:

No.

Defense:

A:

Objection. Asked and answered.

No, no because - -

I will allow the question because I believe the witness

Court:

put another spin on his answer earlier and I will allow
the State to follow-up.
A:

Would you repeat the question for me?
when I was being taken to jail?

Okay.

You said

Q:

It never occurred to you to tell the police that this was all just
a big misunderstanding, did it?

Al:

My hope - -

Q:

It is really just a yes or no question, sir. Did it occur to you to
tell them?

Q:

I don't know.

Defense:

Judge, I'm going to object. The defendant has a right
to remain silent upon questioning, upon being with the
police and remaining silent.
And Counsel is
badgering him about that.

Court:

I will overrule the objection.

When the defendant
chooses to take the witness stand, he waives his right
to be silent and the State can pursue the reason that
he chose to remain silent on the night of the arrest.
So I don't believe it is improper cross-examination
and I will overrule the objection.

(Tr., p. 455, L. 4 - p. 456, L. 11.)
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The state continued with its line of questioning regarding Cobell's initial
statements that he could not have raped Danielle as opposed to having said he
did not rape her.

Q:

Mr. Cobell, when Cheryle Zwang confronted you and said,
'You raped my daughter', you told her in response, 'No
Cheryle. I can't.' Correct?

A:

Correct.

Q:

You didn't say, 'No Cheryle. I didn't.' Did you? You didn't
say that?

A:

No.

(Tr., p. 460, Ls. 10-17.)

Contrary to Cobell's assertion, the intended goal of these lines of crossexamination was to impeach the truthfulness of Cobell's story to the jury by
pointing out that Cobell's version of the facts just after the crime made no
mention of the encounter being consensual or instigated by the victim.

That

version of the facts was first revealed when Cobell took the stand in trial some
five months later. Because a defendant has no right to avoid being confronted
with prior inconsistent statements, Cobell has failed to show that his rights were
even implicated in cross-examination. Further, Cobell has no basis to argue that
the cross-examination relating to his discussion with Officer Cambron was
improper because Cobell once again failed to actually remain silent. When law
enforcement first arrived on scene, Cobell answered questions posed by the
police in their attempt to gather information about what had taken place at the
Zwang home. Officer Cambron testified about an actual conversation with Cobell
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and that conversation took place in the home before Cobell was arrested and
taken to the police station. (Tr. 145, L. 23- p. 165, L. 13.)
The questioning of Cobell was limited in scope and was proper crossexamination. The state was within its right to conduct an inquiry in an attempt to
impeach--eouell by showing that although he answered questions of the victim's
mother and law enforcement prior to being taken down to the station, he did not
come up with the story of Danielle as the aggressor/willing participant until he
took the stand at trial.

The district court was correct in determining the line of

questioning was proper and did not, as Cobell asserts, invite the jury to consider
any pre-arrest silence as evidence of guilt. Cobell chose to make statements,
not to remain silent, about what occurred with his victim. As such, the state had
the right to inquire as to why those statements were different than his version of
events at trial. Cobell has failed to show that the district court violated his Fifth
Amendment rights by allowing the state to engage in a proper cross examination
of Cobell.
II.

Cobell Has Failed To Establish Prosecutorial Misconduct
A.

Introduction
Cobell also contends his right to a fair trial was violated by the

prosecutor's closing argument. (Appellant's brief, p. 14.) He asserts the state's
argument based on inconsistencies between Cobell's trial testimony and
statements on the night in question was improper and that the prosecutor
misstated evidence.

(Id.)

Trial counsel for Cobell did not object the state's

16

closing argument, but instead argues on appeal that the nature of the comments
rises to the level of fundamental error. (Id.)

Cobell's argument fails as he is

unable to establish any misconduct.
B.

Standard Of Review And General Legal Standards Governing Claims Of
Prosecutorial Misconduct
A defendant is not entitled to relief based upon a claim of prosecutorial

misconduct unless he can establish two things: (1) the complained of conduct
was improper; and (2) the improper conduct prejudiced him. State v. RomeroGarcia, 139 Idaho 199, 202, 75 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Ct. App. 2003). Thus, a mere
assertion or finding that a particular question or statement was objectionable or
improper is insufficient to establish prosecutorial misconduct. As explained by
the United States Supreme Court:

"[l]t is not enough that the prosecutors'

remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.

The relevant

question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal quotations and citations
omitted); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("[T]he touchstone
of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.") In that regard, the
Supreme Court has indicated prosecutorial misconduct may occur where the
prosecutor "manipulate[s] or misstate[s] the evidence" or "implicate[s] other
specific rights of the accused such as the right to counsel or the right to remain
silent."

lli. at 181-82.

However, "a criminal conviction is not to be lightly
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overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the
statements or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be
determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial."
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Thus, the Court must consider
the probable effect that the prosecutor's argument "would have on the jury's
ability to judge the evidence fairly."

kl

at 11-12. Consistent with Darden and

Young, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that a conviction will be set aside for
prosecutorial misconduct only when the conduct is sufficiently egregious as to
result in fundamental error.

State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 507, 988 P.2d

1170, 1181 (1999).
With respect to prosecutorial misconduct in the context of closing
argument the Supreme Court has stated:
Isolated passages of a prosecutor's argument, billed in advance to
the jury as a matter of opinion not of evidence, do not reach the
same
proportions
[as
do
consistent
and
repeated
misrepresentations of a dramatic exhibit in evidence].
Such
arguments, like all closing arguments of counsel, are seldom
carefully constructed in toto before the event; improvisation
frequently results in syntax left imperfect and meaning less than
crystal clear. While these general observations in no way justify
prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest that a court should not
lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have
its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy
exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less
damaging interpretations.
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974).
The Idaho Supreme Court has reiterated the importance of reviewing
closing arguments in light of their improvisational nature, noting that "in reviewing
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct [the appellate court] must keep in mind
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the realities of trial."

State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285

(2007) (quoting State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427-28, 725 P.2d 128, 132-33
(1986)). The Idaho Supreme Court has further recognized "[t]he right to due
process does not guarantee a defendant an error-free trial but a fair one," and
the function of appellate review is "not to discipline the prosecutor for
misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not interfere with the
defendant's right to a fair trial." State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d
1002, 1008 (Ct. App. 1991).
Application of the foregoing standards to Cobell's claims of prosecutorial
misconduct reveals he was not deprived of a fair trial.

C.

Cobell Has Failed To Show Any Error In Argument Addressing
Inconsistencies In Cobell's Pre-Trial Statements And His Trial Testimony
Cobell asserts that the state committed misconduct by improperly

commenting on his right to remain silent in closing argument. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 16-18.) Cobell again erroneously asserts that the only purpose for the state's
cross-examination on his pre-arrest silence was to infer Cobell's guilt from such
silence. (Appellant's brief, 17.) Cobell's argument follows that since the crossexamination was improper, so must the comments relating to such crossexamination during closing argument be.

(Appellant's brief, p. 17.) As fully

discussed above, the state's cross-examination of Cobell did not even bring his
Fifth Amendment rights or due process into question. The state properly crossexamined Cobell in an attempt to impeach him by pointing out the vast difference
between his own version of events on the night in question and on the day he

19

took the stand at trial. It follows that the state's comments on such in closing
argument were likewise without error.
Cobell asserts the following statement is improper:
When Cheryle, Cookie Zwang, approaches him and tells him, 'What
did you do to my daughter? You raped her', it is significant, ladies
and gentlemen, that the defendant said, 'I can't.' He didn't say, 'I
didn't, I didn't rape her'. Why is that significant? It is not just that
the nuance of the words because the defendant himself from the
stand is testifying that what he engaged in he doesn't really
consider sex. Because apparently he has decided that unless it is
full penetration, penile-vaginal penetration, that that doesn't qualify.
So when he says 'I can't' versus 'I didn't', that is not a slip. That is
not a small nuance. It is a huge thinking error in his head.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 17-18 (citing Tr. p. 482, L. 15 - p. 483, L. 4).) Cobell also
asserts that a statement made on rebuttal close was improper because the
statements were designed to influence the jury to infer guilt from Cobell's
previous silence:
But for the defendant to say to you today through his attorney that
he didn't have to explain anything to this family, that he didn't have
to explain anything to the police, but to just simply come here today
and give you this dilly of a story is pretty incredible. To want to
comment that there is a divide in this family with an aisle down the
middle and to express how painful that may be, when he has an
opportunity to explain what? That he engaged in an incestual
relationship with your daughter? And that somehow that would be
okay?
Credibility is huge in this case. But ladies and gentlemen, again,
you don't have to leave that at the door. Where is his shame and
his humiliation when he takes that stand and tells you this story in
this fashion?
He never protests, 'I didn't do it.' He never protests and says, 'I
didn't rape Danny.' He say's, 'I can't', because he is confusing
intent with ability. And you should not be persuaded by that at all.
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(Appellant's brief, p. 18 (quoting Tr. p. 507, L. 21 - p. 508, L. 17).)

Neither of

these arguments was in any way improper.
Prosecutors have considerable latitude in closing argument and have the
right to discuss the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising
therefrom.

State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003);

State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007). The
purpose of the prosecutor's closing argument is to enlighten the jury and help the
jurors remember and interpret the evidence. State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445,
450, 816 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. App. 1991).
Because Cobell willingly answered the questions of his victim's mother
and Officer Cambron on scene, giving an entirely different version of events than
his trial testimony, the cross-examination of Cobell was a proper impeachment
technique to point out the inconsistencies of such. The state properly presented
its theory of the case based on the evidence presented.

Cobell has failed to

establish any error by the state in these statements.

D.

Cobell Has Failed to Establish ·Prosecutorial Misconduct Based On A
Stand Alone· Statement About Erectile Dysfunction
Cobell asserts the state committed misconduct when the prosecutor said

"[h]e has a problem with erectile dysfunction, but it is situational" in closing
argument, contending it was without support in the evidence. (Appellant's brief,
p. 19; Tr. 508, Ls. 19-20.) This was a small part of a bigger point the state was
making on rebuttal close in response to Cobell's trial counsel's assertion that
Cobell didn't have the intent to rape because of his erectile dysfunction. (Tr., p.
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499, L. 25 - p. 500, L. 4.) Additionally, the statement was not objected to by trial
counsel. Cobell failed to establish that he is entitled to review of this claim for the
first time on appeal under the fundamental error doctrine.
Misconduct by a prosecutor is fundamental only if the alleged misconduct
is so egregious or inflammatory that any prejudice arising from it was not, or
could not have been, remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury
that it should be disregarded. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785-786, 948 P.2d
127, 140-141 (1997); State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 891, 898, 792 P.2d 916, 923
(1990); State v. Missamore, 114 Idaho 879,761 P.2d 1231 (Ct. App. 1988); State
v. Ames, 109 Idaho 373, 707 P.2d 484 (Ct. App. 1985). The full context of the
statement makes it clear that the statement was not calculated to encourage the
jury to reach a verdict based on improper facts and therefore it was not in
violation of his due process rights as asserted by Cobell:
[Cobell] says, 'I can't', because he is confusing intent with ability.
And you should not be persuaded by that at all. You have nothing
in front of you to believe that the defendant in fact penetrate Danny.
He has a problem with erectile dysfunction, but it is situational.
You know that through the testimony that the Sate elicited in this
case that the issue about going to the strip bars is important
because it shows an intent that he has got going on in here. That
he was very sexually interested and aroused that night. And that
he was interested in going into a strip bar for that arousal and that
gratification. That's why it becomes important in this case.
The fact whether or not he was able to obtain the gratification - - we
don't have to prove. Only that it was done for the purpose of
arousal or gratification. That's why the issue of the strip bars is
important. Because it was on his mind. It was what he was
thinking about. And that is why he attacked Danny in the fashion
and manner in which he did.
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He had sexual arousal. Whether he was able to achieve the end
and means, we don't have to prove that. He himself told you that
he was grinding himself on her vaginal opening.
(Tr., p. 508, L. 15 - p. 509, L. 16.)
When taken in full context, including that it was a response to Cobell's
closing argument, the statement complained of does not rise to the level
necessary to constitute such prejudice that could not have been remedied by a
court ruling. The statement did not call for a guilty verdict based on improper
evidence.

It was a stand-alone,

unexplained statement about erectile

dysfunction which appears to neither add to nor detract from the state's argument
that Cobell had the intent to commit the rape of his grand-niece even if he did not
necessarily have the ability to receive ultimate sexual gratification from such act.
Cobell has failed to show misconduct, let alone fundamental error.

111.
There Is No Cumulative Error
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v.
Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate
to application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v.
Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Cobell has failed to show
that two or more errors occurred in his trial, and therefore the doctrine is
inapplicable to this case. See, M.,, LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 121, 937
P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997). Even if errors in the trial had been shown, they
would not amount to a denial of due process that would require reversal. State v.
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Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Barcella,
135 Idaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation of errors
deemed harmless).

IV.
Cobell Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Sentencing Court's Discretion
By Imposing Concurrent Life Sentences With Ten Years Fixed Following The
Jury's Finding Of Guilt For Rape And Penetration By Foreign Object
A.

Introduction
Cobell argues that his concurrent life sentences with ten years fixed are

excessive given any view of the facts. (Appellant's brief, p. 25.) He contends the
district court did not give proper consideration to the mitigating factors in the
case, specifically his status as a first time offender.

(Appellant's brief, p. 26.)

Cobell further cites his advanced age, poor health, and family support as factors
the court gave insufficient weight to in fashioning his sentence. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 26-32.) Cobell has failed to meet his burden and thereby failed to establish
that the district court abused its discretion in imposing concurrent life sentences
with 10 years fixed upon the jury's guilty verdicts for rape and penetration by
foreign object upon his 20 year old grand-niece.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a defendant alleges an excessive sentence on appeal, the appellate

court independently reviews "all of the facts and circumstances of the case" and
considers the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. State v.
Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 500, 129 P.3d 1241, 1249 (2006).
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To prevail, the

appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the
sentence is excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment. Cope,
142 Idaho at 500, 129 P.3d at 1249. Those objectives are "(1) protection of
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing."
State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). The fixed portion
of the sentence is considered the probable duration of confinement. State v.
Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776, 777, 769 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Ct. App. 1989). A sentence
that does not exceed the statutory maximum will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653
P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). Where reasonable minds might differ as to the
length of sentence, the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the
sentencing court. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490
(1992).

C.

Cobell Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion
The district court properly took into consideration the goals of sentencing

when formulating Cobell's sentence. (Tr., p. 563, L. 2 - p. 564, L. 16.)
Cobell claims that the district court failed to "properly consider" the
mitigating factors in his case. (Appellant's brief, pp. 26-32.) Specifically, Cobell
asserts he was entitled to more lenient treatment based on his status as a first
time offender, as a person of advanced age, as one who has multiple health
concerns, and an individual who has ample family and community support.
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(Appellant's brief, pp. 26-32.) The district court considered all of these factors in
turn, conceding that the appropriate sentence was "not an easy decision." (Tr., p.
564, Ls. 13-16.) The court considered "such factors as age, such factors as
health and such factors as the circumstances," (Tr., p. 569, Ls. 13-14) including:
First of all, I do not believe that the defendant is feigning his
physical problems. I have reviewed the prior medical history and
the reports of his physicians and, yes, indeed, he does have the
physical problems which he claims to have. And he does in fact
suffer from the diseases that he claims to suffer from.
(Tr., p. 564, Ls. 17-23.) Further, the court noted Cobell was "72 years old. You
have lived a long life. And you have lived apparently a pretty good darn life. A
lot of people think very highly of you." (Tr., p. 567, Ls. 6-9.)
Against the mitigation, the court considered the evidence presented at trial
which resulted in jury convictions for rape and forcible penetration by foreign
object:
[T]he defendant was not the only person there that night. There
were other people in that house. And it was not just the victim.
Without objection, Mr. Cobell, every individual who was in that
house that night and saw your behavior and saw the behavior of
the victim believed the victim. Every one of them. Not just
immediate family members, but the police, everyone who dealt with
the victim that night believed she had in fact been raped. So don't
just say it is a he said she said. Because there were others there
and every one of them believed the victim's story in this case.
And ultimately when the matter was presented to the jury after both
of you had had the opportunity to explain the facts and to testify
and to be examined and cross-examined, a jury of 12 members
determined that they believed the victim's story as well and found
you guilty of both of these crimes.
(Tr., p. 565, L. 15 - p. 566, L. 10.) The district court also weighed the impact of
Cobell's actions on his victim. "This young lady who you raped or assaulted or
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battered, depending on what term you want to use, is never going to have the
benefit of putting this behind her. Never totally." (Tr., p. 567, Ls. 10-13.)
The presentence investigator refrained from making a recommendation,
deferring instead to the district court judge who presided over the jury trial, but
did include recommendations of the psychosexual evaluator. (PSI, pp. 17-19.)
Although the psychosexual evaluator concluded Cobell was a low to medium risk
sexually re-offend, he determined that Cobell did "not appear to be an
appropriate candidate for community supervision or treatment in the community."
(Psychosexual Evaluation, pp. 8-9 (attached to PSI).)

The examiner weighed

Cobell's mitigating factors against the negative contributing factors in reaching
this conclusion:
It is this examiner's conclusions [sic] that Mr. Cobell is a LOW to
MEDIUM risk to sexually, violently, or criminally re-offend. He
scored LOW risk to re-offend on all of the risk assessments and he
possesses a number of factors and traits supportive of a low risk to
re-offend. He has a positive employment history, no prior criminal
history, this is his first documented offense of this type, and he has
been a rather stable member of the community for all of his life. On
the other hand, Mr. Cobell continues to deny that he raped his
victim and does not see a need to obtain any sex offender
treatment. He places blame on his victim and believes that the only
person he has wronged is his wife. He does not have an
explanation for his actions and appears to only be concerned about
how this offense will affect him and not necessarily the victim.
Therefore, Mr. Cobell does not appear to be amenable for
treatment at this time, which in this examiner's opinion increases
his risk to re-offend.
(Psychosexual Evaluation, p. 8 (attached to PSI).
Cobell is of advanced age, does suffer from a number of health issues,
and appears to have the support of a community. Although Cobell lived many
decades as a law-abiding citizen, his first run-in with the legal system was for the
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commission of incredibly serious crimes.

Cobell was convicted by a jury of

raping and using a foreign object to forcibly penetrate his 20 year old grand-niece
while pulling her head back with her ponytail to maintain her compliance. Cobell
committed a series of violent acts against a young family member and continued
to maintain the interaction was consensual. He continued to hold to this position
following a jury verdict establishing his guilt. Although Cobell points to his low
risk to re-offend (Appellant's brief, p. 32), he fails to address the ultimate effect of
his denial on his amenability to treatment and therefore his potential risk to reoffend. The psychosexual evaluation, however, considers just that:
Since Mr. Cobell does not accept the fact that he raped his victim,
he does not appear to be an appropriate candidate for community
supervision or treatment in the community.

Therefore, Mr. Cobell does . not appear to be amenable for
treatment at this time, which in this examiner's opinion increases
his risk to re-offend.
(Psychosexual Evaluation, p. 8 (attached to PSI).)
Cobell has failed to show that the sentences of life with 10 years fixed are
excessive considering his potential risk to the community based on the
seriousness of his convictions combined with his continued denial of wrong doing
and inability to take responsibility for his actions.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court uphold Cobell's convictions
and affirm the district court's sentence.

DATED this 29th day of July 2009.
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